Saturday, October 25, 2014

Wars (by other means)

Η Σαουδική Αραβία κήρυξε πετρελαϊκό πόλεμο

22/10/2014
Ρωτήστε οποιονδήποτε δυτικό διπλωμάτη, που ασχολείται με θέματα Μέσης Ανατολής, τι σημαίνει ο όρος «το όπλο του πετρελαίου» και θα σας απαντήσει ότι είναι η προσπάθεια των πετρελαιοπαραγωγών χωρών του Περσικού Κόλπου να επηρεάσουν τις σχέσεις των ΗΠΑ με το Ισραήλ παρεμβαίνοντας στις διεθνείς τιμές του πετρελαίου – άλλοτε, δηλαδή, μπλοκάροντας τη ροή του μαύρου χρυσού και άλλοτε τροφοδοτώντας την αγορά με μεγάλες ποσότητες προκειμένου να ρίξουν κατακόρυφα τις τιμές. Αυτό τουλάχιστον ίσχυε από την μεγάλη πετρελαϊκή κρίση του 1973 μέχρι πριν από μερικά χρόνια, όταν η Σαουδική Αραβία έδειξε ότι μπορεί να χρησιμοποιήσει το «όπλο του πετρελαίου» όχι εναντίον των ΗΠΑ αλλά σε συνεργασία μαζί της.
Όπως είχαμε εξηγήσει από τον περασμένο Μάρτιο, μετά την επίσημη επίσκεψη του Αμερικανού προέδρου Μπαράκ Ομπάμα στο Ριάντ, κυκλοφορούσαν έντονες φήμες ότι οι δυο χώρες σχεδίαζαν να «πνίξουν» την διεθνή αγορά ενέργειας στο πετρέλαιο προκειμένου να ρίξουν τις τιμές έως και κατά 12 δολάρια το βαρέλι και έτσι να πλήξουν οικονομικά τη Ρωσία. Στο συγκεκριμένο σχέδιο είχε αναφερθεί ακόμη και ο Τζορτζ Σόρος, κατά τη διάρκεια ομιλίας του στο Βερολίνο ενώ ο Φίλιπ Βέρλεγκερ, πρώην σύμβουλος των κυβερνήσεων Φόρντ και Κάρτερ υπολόγιζε ότι και μόνο οι ΗΠΑ να έριχναν ημερησίως στην αγορά 500.000 βαρέλια από τα στρατηγικά τους αποθέματα το οικονομικό κόστος για τη Μόσχα θα άγγιζε τα 40 δισεκατομμύρια δολάρια ή το 2% της ρωσικής οικονομίας. Ανάλογο πλήγμα όμως θα δεχόταν και η οικονομία του Ιράν.
Στόχος μιας τέτοιας επιχείρησης, σύμφωνα τουλάχιστον με το σχετικό σενάριο, θα ήταν να χτυπηθούν οι δυο βασικοί πυλώνες που στήριζαν το καθεστώς της Συρίας, δηλαδή η Μόσχα και η Τεχεράνη και έτσι να ανοίξει ο δρόμος για την ανατροπή του Ασαντ. Παρά το γεγονός ότι το Ιράν, υπό την ηγεσία του φιλοδυτικού Ρουχανί, δεν προσέφερε στη Συρία την στήριξη που ανέμενε κανείς πριν από λίγα χρόνια και ενώ η Ρωσία δεν κλιμάκωσε την αντιπαράθεση για το ίδιο θέμα, οι δυο χώρες παρέμεναν το βασικότερο αγκάθι στα μάτια της Σαουδικής Αραβίας.
Το τουρκικό πρακτορείο Ανατολή όμως, υποστήριξε πριν από μερικές ημέρες ότι αυτό που αποτελούσε ένα υποθετικό σχέδιο επί χάρτου άρχισε να γίνεται πραγματικότητα. Μιλώντας στους Τούρκους δημοσιογράφους, ο Ρασίντ Ανμπάμι, πρόεδρος του σαουδαραβικού κέντρου «Πετρελαϊκής Πολιτικής και Στρατηγικών Μελετών» δήλωσε ότι το Ριάντ θα αρχίσει να πουλά πετρέλαιο σε τιμές 50 και 60 δολαρίων τα βαρέλι στις αγορές της Ασίας και της Βόρειας Αμερικής. Ο ίδιος υποστήριξε ότι ήταν η παρέμβαση της Σαουδικής Αραβίας που έριξε τις διεθνείς τιμές από τα 115 στα 92 δολάρια το βαρέλι σε διάστημα τριών μηνών. Με δεδομένο ότι η ρωσική κυβέρνηση είχε στηρίξει τον φετινό της προϋπολογισμό στην υπόθεση ότι η τιμή θα κυμαίνονταν στα 100 δολάρια το βαρέλι, η μείωση σημαίνει σημαντικές απώλειες εισοδήματος.
Αν και οι σχετικές εκτιμήσεις μένει να επιβεβαιωθούν (και ενώ το Ριάντ θα υποστηρίζει επισήμως ότι η μείωση της τιμής δεν γίνεται για πολιτικούς λόγους αλλά με στόχο την ανάπτυξη σε νέες αγορές) μια σειρά σχετικών ειδήσεων έρχονται να ενισχύσουν τα σχετικά σενάρια. Όπως ανέφερε προ ημερών η Wall Street Journal, την ίδια στιγμή που η Σαουδική Αραβία ρίχνει τις τιμές του μαύρου χρυσού επιβάλει στους πελάτες της μια πολύ επιθετική πολιτική αναγκάζοντάς τους να εγγυηθούν ότι θα αγοράσουν το σύνολο της ποσότητας στη συμφωνημένη τιμή. Στο παρελθόν το βασίλειο των Σαούντ προσέφερε στα διυλιστήρια ένα ποσοστό 10% διαπραγμάτευσης στην αρχικά συμφωνημένη τιμή. Βασικό θύμα της νέας πολιτικής, σύμφωνα με την αμερικανική εφημερίδα, θα είναι η αγορά της Ευρώπης στην οποία θα επιβληθούν οι νέοι όροι.
Η Σαουδική Αραβία δηλαδή φαίνεται ότι επιχειρεί να διασφαλίσει την δική της απώλεια κερδών από την πτώση των τιμών επιβάλλοντας στους πελάτες τους την αγορά μεγαλύτερων ποσοτήτων και με πολύ αυστηρότερους όρους.
Θεωρείται δεδομένο ότι οι σχετικές κινήσεις του Ριάντ γίνονται αν όχι σε απόλυτη συνεργασία τουλάχιστον εν γνώσει των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών η οποία έστειλε στην περιοχή αρχικά τον πρόεδρο Ομπάμα και πολύ πιο πρόσφατα τον υπουργό Εξωτερικών Τζον Κέρι. Βασικος στόχος των επισκέψεων ήταν να γεφυρωθεί το χάσμα που είχε προκύψει όταν οι ΗΠΑ ανέβαλαν τα σχέδια εισβολής στη Συρία. Ως γνωστόν το Ριάντ δεν μπορούσε να κρύψει την οργή του για αυτή την απόφαση αλλά και για την διπλωματική «αντάντ» που έχει συνάψει η Ουάσιγκτον με την Τεχεράνη.
Το πρώτο «αντάλλαγμα» που φέρεται να έλαβε το Ριάντ από τις επαφές με τον Τζον Κέρι είναι το δικαίωμα να συνεχίζει να εκπαιδεύει και να εξοπλίζει ακραίες δυνάμεις που μάχονται το καθεστώς Ασαντ – πρόκειται για την ίδια διαδικασία μέσω της οποίας δημιουργήθηκε το κίνημα τζιχαντιστών του ISIS με την ανοχή και την γενικότερη εποπτεία αμερικανικών υπηρεσιών όπως η CIA. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο είναι μάλλον απλουστευτικό να υποθέσει κανείς ότι οι δυο χώρες δεν συζήτησαν και την πολιτική τους στις αγορές ενέργειας η οποία ενισχύει τα αμερικανικά συμφέροντα και σε οικονομικό επίπεδο αλλά κυρίως σε πολιτικό λόγω των πιέσεων που ασκούνται στη Μόσχα.
Η Σαουδική Αραβία θέτει πλέον ως προτεραιότητα οποιασδήποτε συνεργασίας της με ξένες χώρες να δεσμευτούν για την ταχύτερη δυνατή ανατροπή του καθεστώτος Ασάντ με κάθε κόστος. Και αν οι προηγούμενες προσπάθειες είχαν σαν αποτέλεσμα τη δημιουργία ενός τέρατος, όπως το ISIS, κανένας δεν μπορεί αν εγγυηθεί ότι αυτό το λάθος δεν θα επαναληφθεί.
Άρης Χατζηστεφάνου
ΕΠΙΚΑΙΡΑ Σεπτέμβριος 2014

Sunday, June 8, 2014

The Greek "Success Story" of a Crushing Economy and a Failed State

http://truth-out.org/news/item/21265-the-greek-success-story-of-a-crushing-economy-and-a-failed-state?tmpl=component&print=1

Contrary to the official story, Greece's economy is not recovering, and the continuation of the Troika's neoliberal austerity medicine assures the country a bleak economic and social future.

The official story about Greece is that its economy is recovering after being in the grips of a severe economic depression that has lasted six years, wiping out 25 percent of GDP and raising the official unemployment rate over 27 percent. The government points to the elimination of the current account deficit for 2013 (it is claimed that a primary surplus has been secured, which is the first one for Greece since 2002) as hard evidence that the economy is out of the woods. Thus, in spite of a government debt-to-GDP ratio which is hovering around 170 percent, the conservative Greek prime minister Antonis Samaras is confident that the debt level will become sustainable in 2014. Little wonder then that he has labeled the austerity experiment as a Greek "success story."

To read more articles by C.J. Polychroniou and other authors in the Public Intellectual Project, click here.

This article not only debunks the myth of Greece as an economic "success story," but shows that current trends and developments in the country make for a bleak economic future. The mindless austerity imposed on Greece by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund - the so-called "troika" - as part of the bailout agreements has had a catastrophic effect on Greek economy and society while the policies of privatization and structural reforms including radical labor market restructuring have set the stage for the emergence of a type of economy in which economic inefficiency, brutal economic exploitation, severe inequality, foreign dependence and environmental degradation will be the primary characteristics. The claim made here is that the wild neoliberal experiment under way in Greece will produce an economy that will resemble features not of the Celtic Tiger of the mid-1990s to early 2000s - as the current government envisions - but that of an underdeveloped Latin American country of the 1960s.

Whether the conversion of Greece from a fairly developed economy into a colonial periphery is by design or not on the part of the nation's international creditors is of secondary importance: This is the price Greece is paying for being a bankrupt nation as a member state of a currency union that has a deeply flawed institutional architecture and is being led by a hegemon that practices an extreme type of economic nationalism and "beggar thy neighbor" policies.

As long as Greece remains in the euro zone, and the euro zone remains what it is today, the country will most likely remain mired in its austerity trap for many years to come - with or without debt restructuring in the official sector. (Close to 90 percent of Greece's public debt is now in the hands of the European Central Bank and of European governments). Even the IMF's overly optimistic projections for a public debt-to-GDP ratio of 124 percent by 2020 imply commitment to fiscal discipline.

The current European Union is fully committed to antigrowth austerity policies, as reflected in various European laws, including the infamous Fiscal Compact. What it would take to reverse this situation is beyond the task of this article, but suffice it to say that European governments seem most determined to remain part of the euro zone under the current regime. In such an environment, euro zone member states that exhibit a proclivity for "fiscal profligacy" must be reformed by any means necessary or face the possibility of being forced out of the Euro area. This is clearly the story behind the drama that has been unfolding in Greece and the European Union since the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008.

A Cursory Look at Greece's Fiscal Crisis under the Euro

The economic problems of Greece that led to its bankruptcy have been attributed mainly to "fiscal profligacy," a process aided by a deeply corrupt and inefficient political system. Indeed, the country lived beyond its means, if that what is meant by "fiscal profligacy." As Figure 1 shows below, an upward trend in public debt started in the early 1980s, reaching its endgame in early 2010, when the country went bust and was forced into the arms of the "troika."
2014.1.16.Greece Chart

The "fiscal profligacy" argument in support of the cause behind Greece's bankruptcy gains further credibility by the fact that Greece had by far the largest government debt in the euro area (Figure 2). And there is hardly anyone would deny the phenomenon of institutionalized corruption and the working of a kleptocratic state in contemporary Greece.

Nonetheless, Greece was allowed to enter the euro area with a government debt to GDP ratio that was already close to 100 percent, and its public debt load didn't work its way up to unsustainable levels until the start of the global financial crisis. When it got close to the 130 percent mark in 2009 (Figure 2), the country was already in the midst of a major recession.

2014.1.19.CJ.Fig.2

Thus, in spite of the high levels of public debt between 2001-2007, the Greek government was able to service the debt because the economy posted some seemingly impressive growth rates in real GDP, with an average of slightly less than 4 percent annually. With access to cheap credit, high growth rates were easier to attain for an economy with other severe structural economic weaknesses. Indeed, during the period under consideration, the yield on Greek 10-year bonds was just marginally higher (0.3 percent) than on their German counterpart. But the gap began to increase substantially by late 2009 and early 2010 - once the Greek deficit was discovered to have been double what it was originally believed to be (close to 13 percent of the GDP while later on it was revised to over 15 percent), with the public debt-to-GDP ratio standing close to 130 percent. By late 2010, the 10-year Greek government bond yield stood close to 12 percent.

The "growth performance" of the Greek economy had little to do with a dynamic capitalist economy. Growth relied on the twin pillars of state borrowing and European Union (EU) transfers. Between 2002-2006, EU transfers amounted to approximately 20 billion euros, which, according to some estimates, equals about 3.3 percent of annual GDP.

Of course, over-indebtedness and EU transfers to Greece represent only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is the huge amount of funds paid to creditors. According to the Bank of Greece, for the seven-year period leading to 2004, Greece paid 208 billion euros to its creditors, and yet its debt did not decrease but rather increased, from 105 billion to 185.3 billion euros. This is the same ugly and vicious cycle of debt that many Latin American and other third world countries found themselves in at the height of western financial exploitation back in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, by 2006, Greece had already posted the second largest public debt among the 27 EU member-states. In addition, Greece's debt was mostly external. In 2009, Greece's external public debt constituted 89 percent of GDP.

Greece's fiscal woes were intensified by the huge discrepancy between expenditure and revenues. The data from show that the Greek government collected 7.9 percent of GDP from direct taxes when the average EU government collected 13.7 percent.

As further evidence of the weak foundations of growth in the Greek economy between 2001-2007, all-time historical levels of consumption were recorded in Greece (consumption reached close to 90 percent of GDP) by the early 2000s, but investment went down (it represented slightly over 20 percent of GDP). In plain economic terms, "this means that Greek citizens were consuming more, while less was spent on productive investment, such as factories and highways," according to "The Economic Crisis in Greece: A Time of Reform and Opportunity," a report by economists Costas Meghir,  Dimitri Vayanos and Nikos Vettas.

Greece's participation in the euro zone was imbricated in a host of other interesting and profound contradictions. Capital accumulation, for example, proceeded during the first five years of the country's entry into the euro zone "at a rate which is equivalent to that of the growth of public deficit and debt rather than that of domestic consumption."[1] Specifically, capital formation grew by 89 percent when domestic consumption registered a 39 percent growth. Thus, "this development deformed the real economy as capital formation developed, not in relation to the domestic and global market, but on the basis of the demands of finance capital." In a similar vein, while labor productivity increased for the same five-year period by an average annual rate of 3 percent, real average wages increased by only 0.8 percent. [2]

In sum, Greek economic growth between 2001 and 2007 was largely based on overconsumption, ever-increasing debt levels, and a capital accumulation process divorced from the real economy. It was a period of economic growth in the midst of bubbles. Moreover, under the euro regime, Greece's competitiveness declined by almost 25 percent - the icing on the cake to the nation's participation in a currency union that has so far proven itself to be a massive failure. [3]

The Greek Bailout Disaster

Greece's real problems with its participation in the euro zone began with the so-called "bailout" plan patched together by the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) when the country was effectively shut out of the international bond markets sometime in the spring of 2010 and faced the prospect of a default. Rushing to the judgment that the roots of the Greek financial crisis lay with a bloated public sector, the EU/IMF "bailout" plan involved a massive loan package accompanied by harsh antigrowth austerity measures at a time when the Greek economy was already shrinking as it found itself in the midst of a recession.

Specifically, the "bailout" plan that went into effect in May 2010 denied a bankrupt country the opportunity to restructure its debt, offering instead a massive loan package of 110 billion euros (at the usurious interest rate of 5 percent) to the Greek government that included onerous demands: a rapid fiscal consolidation program (intended to reduce deficits and the accumulation of debt) that hadn't been seen in policymaking circles since the harsh economic adjustment program imposed by Ceausescu on the Romanians in the 1980s and a related set of economic policies based on long disproven assumptions (e.g., labor standards undermine competitiveness; flexible labor reduces unemployment; austerity boosts business confidence and generates growth - and privatization saves money). Accordingly, the structural adjustment and austerity programs implemented in Greece by the European Union (EU) and IMF featured sharp cuts in wages, pensions and social benefits; sharp increases in taxes; labor market liberalization; the blanket privatization of public assets and state-owned resources; and public sector layoffs.

Contrary to EU and Greek government propaganda, the "bailout" plan did not constitute an act of solidarity on the part of Greece's EU partners and its financial backers. At stake were Europe's banks, which were overexposed to Greek debt, and the stability of the euro. Even so, EU officials appeared quite confident in public that the bailout agreement would help Greece put its economy back on track in a relatively short time and allow it to return to international credit markets by the end of 2011 or early 2012. Of course, most economists across the ideological spectrum were not merely skeptical about the bailout deal, but actually thought that the measures that came attached to the rescue funds would sink the Greek economy into deeper recession.

The bailout agreement covered three years, with the plan's primary objectives identified as lowering the deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2013, restoring debt sustainability, achieving internal devaluation for the purpose of reducing domestic demand, improving competitiveness and increasing investments and exports. The fiscal consolidation strategy aiming to lower the deficit and restore debt sustainability involved a package of measures that amounted to 11 percent of the country's GDP. With the corrections in place, the forecast called for the appearance of a primary surplus by 2012.

According to IMF expectations, the implementation of the structural adjustment program would allow the economy to quickly regain some of the competitiveness lost due to high labor costs and, after a slow increase, the debt would start declining after 2013. In the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Greece and its EU/IMF creditors, the Greek government was expected to carry out the required reforms with lightning speed, and the "troika" officials responsible for the supervision of the Greek structural adjustment program would review its progress on a quarterly basis to determine when the next installment of rescue funds (which were to be used exclusively for the country's debt obligations) should be released.

This approach to dealing with a nation's economic woes is rather typical of IMF thinking, which envisions a national economy being like a ship that can change course almost instantaneously at the command of its captain. As for the national culture, there was no reason why it could not be taken apart like a car engine and retooled in no time. The idea that the IMF has changed its philosophy and the tactics it pursues is hogwash. In fact, in spite of the much parroted claims of various senior-level officials that the organization has learned from its past mistakes and has altered the way it approaches nations in need of economic guidance and assistance, the mentality of the IMF (and its neoliberal acolytes everywhere) is still stuck in the era of the Pinochet regime in Chile, when guns and torture were widely used as means to enforce fiscal discipline and a "free-market" utopia on an otherwise unaccommodating nation. The IMF approach has failed everywhere it has been tried, in the process making a mockery of economic science and shredding democratic ideals and values.

From Latin America to Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s to Europe's periphery today, the unfolding of the neoliberal experiment has produced a social dystopia, leading to lower economic growth rates, rolling back social progress and increasing inequalities. As was to be expected, the bailout deal of May 2010 turned out to be an EU/IMF fiasco and a Greek tragedy. Greece's deficit shrank, but so did everything else - and in much greater proportions: employment, tax revenues, investment, consumer demand, and social and human services. The public debt increased substantially, and so did every index of economic misery and social malaise, including the spread of anti-immigrant extremism and waves of suicides related to economic hardship. But Greece's financial partners had no interest in the social and economic consequences of the fiscal consolidation hoax they had perpetrated. All that mattered was attaining fiscal balance - that is, ensuring that the banks would keep on receiving payments for the Greek sovereign bonds they held.

The austerity-based fiscal adjustment program began to show catastrophic effects within a few months. Small-size businesses were shutting down at record levels, and unemployment had begun its upward spiral. In May 2010, the unemployment rate stood at 12 percent; by May 2011, it had jumped to 16.6 percent. The austerity measures were also having a major effect on tax revenues. In spite of repeated tax hikes - including across-the-board sales tax increases, a reduction in nontaxable income, and an emergency property tax on all homeowners - state revenues declined, with the pension and social insurance funds taking especially huge drops. According to the Greek Statistical Authority, state revenues for 2011 were lower than in 2009, "the year," as some commentators acutely observed, "of the absolute fiscal derailing." [4]

The May 2010 bailout agreement was to have been a one-time deal. Yet, even before the ink had dried, everyone (except the EU officials) could see that it was not going to be enough to help Greece overcome its crisis - and certainly not enough to stop the spread of contagion. Accordingly, Greek bond yields kept soaring to ever greater heights, freezing Greece out of the private financial markets for an indefinite period of time, and the bond vigilantes went on a safari for more fiscally wild "PIIGS."

Nearing the end of the first two years of the bailout, euro zone finance ministers ended up approving a new rescue package deal for Greece worth 130 billion euros. Without the new bailout funds, the country would have defaulted. Interestingly enough, stocks fell when the announcement was made, as markets were quick to realize that, once again, the deal wasn't going to solve the Greek crisis. By that time, Greece had already made the transition from crisis to catastrophe. Austerity was crushing the Greek economy and causing a slowdown in every peripheral euro zone economy that was implementing deep austerity measures in the midst of a major recession. But dogma is dogma and, as such, it has to be reinforced regardless of any empirical reality. Thus, the second bailout package included even more budget cuts across the board, the reduction of public employment by 150,000 by the end of 2015, and a massive privatization project - essentially an all-out neoliberal attack on public goods and all publicly owned enterprises in Greece. "A Nation for Sale" is how many Greek citizens have come to regard the terms and conditions included in the second bailout agreement. On sale, among other highly valuable state assets, are the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki; the Greek telecom OTE; the national lottery; prime real estate; and the postal bank. All at fire sale prices. [5]

Greece's financial backers expected the privatization projects to raise 50 billion euros by 2015, revealing how wildly out of touch they were with Greek economic reality - although a more likely scenario is that the urgent push for privatization was simply a Machiavellian plan to transfer public wealth into private hands. After all, it is beyond contention that the Greek debt crisis has been utilized as an opportunity to dismantle the social state, to sell off profitable public enterprises and state assets at bargain prices, to deprive labor of its most basic rights, and to substantially reduce wages and pensions - all with the support of a significant segment of the Greek industrial/financial class and with the assistance of the domestic political elite, which, since the onset of the crisis, has relied heavily on dictatorial action to meet the demands of the country's foreign creditors and to institutionalize a much-sought-after neoliberal economic order.

For the first two years of the first bailout agreement, EU leaders and the Greek government alike also made a mockery of any suggestion that Greece's unsustainable public debt should be restructured, a move that should have been undertaken almost immediately after the crisis broke out. In May 2012, a debt restructuring deal was reached with most of the private investors, who, after Germany and the EU used some strong arm tactics, agreed to swap their government bonds for new securities worth less than half the previous securities. Greek government bonds held by the ECB were excluded from the "haircut." As it turned out, this was yet one more move on the part of EU leaders to buy time, since the restructuring deal still left Greece's debt at unsustainable levels (at around 132 percent), while placing new Greek bond issues under British law (hence the Greek Parliament cannot pass legislation refusing payment).

The terms of the second "bailout" out package accelerated the free fall of the economy and intensified the social decomposition that was underway, and, hence, Greece's conversion from a fairly developed nation into a poor and dependent periphery. Greek GDP contracted by 6.4 percent in 2012, and dropped by another 5.6 percent in the first quarter of 2013. During the second quarter of 2013, the decline of the GDP was not as sharp at -3.8 percent, mainly because of an improvement in trade and tourism. Greek GDP is projected to post a decline of 4.8 percent for 2013.

In the meantime, the upward trend in unemployment continued, climbing from 24.2 percent in 2012 to 27.6 percent in 2013, the largest unemployment rate in all of the euro zone and at levels comparable to those that Greece had in 1961.

Thanks to the austerity measures, wages were slashed by close to 25 percent in the course of the past three years (purchasing power actually dropped by 37 percent), forcing in turn a reduction in domestic demand of 31 percent.

As for the public debt-ratio-to-GDP - which according to IMF forecasts would start declining by 2013 over its 2010 levels - not only did not shrink, but climbed to 170 percent (at 330 billion euros) by the end of 2013, leaving the nation permanently trapped in a state of peonage.

Primary Surplus: To What End?

The alleged Greek "success story" behind the austerity experiment in Greece rests exclusively on the elimination of the current account deficit and the recording of a small primary surplus, which, as of this writing, has yet to be verified. The attainment of a primary surplus is a key objective of the "troika" since it will allegedly help speed up Greece's return to the international private credit markets (recall that according to the forecasts of the architects of the first "bailout" agreement, Greece was to return to credit markets by late 2011 or early 2012). However, the real reason for the "troika's" obsession with a primary surplus is purely political: It serves as "evidence" that the austerity medicine works.

Greece's current account began to decline by early 2012, and, by the end of that year, it had contracted by an amazing 72.9 percent in comparison to 2011. In actual figures, this meant a contraction of over 15 billion euros. The bulk of the contraction came from major declines in the trade deficit (7.6 billion euros) and in the income account deficit (6.4 billion euros).

While not necessarily a bad thing, ceteris paribus, the massive reduction in the current account of Greece in 2012 is intrinsically related to the deteriorating economic condition of the working people in the country, who have seen their wages slashed dramatically and their purchasing power sent back to mid-1990s levels. The alleged realization of a primary surplus for 2013 has been accomplished through the further deterioration of economic and social conditions.

Indeed, this is the main problem and the actual nature of the economic tragedy in Greece today. Instead of pursuing pro-growth, pro-employment policies, which would stimulate economic activity and put people back to work, the EU and IMF architects of Greece's "bailout" plans opted from the beginning to impose draconian, neo-Hooverian policies on a crumbling economy. Indeed, facing a financing gap for 2015 and 2016, Greece will end up with yet another bailout agreement sometime by late 2014. Therefore, what purpose does a primary surplus serve in the midst of a crashing economy other than that of an ideological weapon to justify the insane policies of austerity?

The celebration over the primary surplus is nothing short of a desperate attempt on the part of the Greek government to cover up the catastrophic failure of the austerity experiment and hence of the bailout agreements with the European Union and the IMF. The Greek economy is not recovering by any stretch of the imagination, but remains under the firm grip of a major depression, though it is possibly slowing down after six painful years, with 2013 continuing in the rhythms set by the depression in 2011 and 2012, thereby proving how lethal the policies of austerity have been for Greece. Exports, for example, which apparently were to receive a major boost through the policy of internal devaluation, are struggling to make any inroads: in fact, in September of 2013, total exports amounted to 2.39 billion euros, while in September of 2012, they amounted to 2.44 billion euros, thus registering a decline of 2.2 percent.

The industrial production index in Greece, as recently reported by the Greek Statistical Authority, posted a decline of 6.1 percent between October 2012 and October 2013, while construction (one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy in the pre-crisis period) dropped by 36.6 percent between September 2012 and September 2013.

In the meantime, because of the severe budget cuts, the Greek public health care system has virtually collapsed, along with the nation's public education system, thereby leaving no doubt that a failed state has emerged in contemporary Greece.

Finally, another great irony of the Greek "success story" is that the debt of the public sector has spread into the banking and private sector as well. Having received the sum of 50 billion euros in recapitalization from the government in order to keep them breathing, Greek banks are still unable or unwilling to provide much needed credit to businesses and consumers, claiming that they face a huge percentage of non-performing bad loans, which according to most estimates exceed 20 percent of all loans combined, and the figure is expected to rise in 2014-15. Greek banks will most likely need additional capital, and rather soon, thus increasing even further the public debt and, with the further deterioration of the overall economic climate, making it even harder for banks to help spur growth.

In sum, the future of Greek banks does not look any rosier than that of the overall Greek economy, and the likelihood that they will eventually pass into foreign hands is a rather strong possibility, although nationalizing them should be on top of the agenda of any Greek government dedicated to getting the economy out of the depression and avoiding the country's conversion into a peripheral colony of the EU.

Future Prospects for Greece

Within the next 1-2 years, Greece may see the sharp and continuous decline of its GDP come to a halt. It would be a sign that the economy has reached rock bottom - not a sign of economic recovery, or that the path to growth has finally opened up. Any growth prospects for Greece remain dim without the implementation of a growth-oriented strategy. Some economists have proposed a new Marshall Plan for Greece, which under current conditions would be the only rational strategy to pursue for the sake of Greece and the future of the euro zone - but the current political leadership in Europe is unlikely to adopt such measures - unless it is politically forced to do so. However, the political situation in Europe is anything but promising, and developments inside a single nation alone will hardly carry enough force to compel a change of course inside the rest of Europe.

Yet, an objective observer would have a difficult time seeing how a nation like Greece can be sustained and remain a member of the euro zone if the policies of the last three-and-a half years continue. The stupendous rise in unemployment in Greece, for example, is the result of crude neoliberal policies, and the problem of lack of employment will not disappear with the refinement of these catastrophic policies, but rather with their abandonment. Even with a return to growth, the current levels of unemployment in Greece will never return to pre-crisis levels without the implementation of serious government-sector employment policies.

Indeed, the structural adjustment program underway in Greece will not lead to a growing and sustainable economy, and the empirical evidence is nowhere to be found that such programs have ever produced viable economies and decent societies. In Greece, in fact, they have already produced an economic and social disaster of historically gigantic proportions. One out of three Greeks is already near the poverty line, and in a recent poll, almost half of the population expressed the desire to leave the country. Greece is already on its way to resembling a Latin America country of the 1960s, and its condition as such cannot be reversed while the country is forced to go on carrying unsustainable government debt loads. Today's European leaders are showing no sign of being willing to take the necessary steps to help Greece reduce its debt burden. In all likelihood, they won't do so until the looting of the nation's wealth has been completed.

Now, that would be a true neoliberal "success story"!

Saturday, May 31, 2014

Afterthoughts on Piketty’s Capital


Afterthoughts on Piketty's Capital

David Harvey

Thomas Piketty has written a book called Capital that has caused quite a stir. He advocates progressive taxation and a global wealth tax as the only way to counter the trend towards the creation of a "patrimonial" form of capitalism marked by what he dubs "terrifying" inequalities of wealth and income. He also documents in excruciating and hard to rebut detail how social inequality of both wealth and income has evolved over the last two centuries, with particular emphasis on the role of wealth. He demolishes the widely-held view that free market capitalism spreads the wealth around and that it is the great bulwark for the defense of individual liberties and freedoms. Free-market capitalism, in the absence of any major redistributive interventions on the part of the state, Piketty shows, produces anti-democratic oligarchies. This demonstration has given sustenance to liberal outrage as it drives the Wall Street Journal apoplectic.

The book has often been presented as a twenty-first century substitute for Karl Marx's nineteenth century work of the same title. Piketty actually denies this was his intention, which is just as well since his is not a book about capital at all. It does not tell us why the crash of 2008 occurred and why it is taking so long for so many people to get out from under the dual burdens of prolonged unemployment and millions of houses lost to foreclosure. It does not help us understand why growth is currently so sluggish in the US as opposed to China and why Europe is locked down in a politics of austerity and an economy of stagnation. What Piketty does show statistically (and we should be indebted to him and his colleagues for this) is that capital has tended throughout its history to produce ever-greater levels of inequality. This is, for many of us, hardly news. It was, moreover, exactly Marx's theoretical conclusion in Volume One of his version of Capital. Piketty fails to note this, which is not surprising since he has since claimed, in the face of accusations in the right wing press that he is a Marxist in disguise, not to have read Marx's Capital.

Piketty assembles a lot of data to support his arguments. His account of the differences between income and wealth is persuasive and helpful. And he gives a thoughtful defense of inheritance taxes, progressive taxation and a global wealth tax as possible (though almost certainly not politically viable) antidotes to the further concentration of wealth and power.

But why does this trend towards greater inequality over time occur? From his data (spiced up with some neat literary allusions to Jane Austen and Balzac) he derives a mathematical law to explain what happens: the ever-increasing accumulation of wealth on the part of the famous one percent (a term popularized thanks of course to the "Occupy" movement) is due to the simple fact that the rate of return on capital (r) always exceeds the rate of growth of income (g). This, says Piketty, is and always has been "the central contradiction" of capital.

But a statistical regularity of this sort hardly constitutes an adequate explanation let alone a law. So what forces produce and sustain such a contradiction? Piketty does not say. The law is the law and that is that. Marx would obviously have attributed the existence of such a law to the imbalance of power between capital and labor. And that explanation still holds water. The steady decline in labor's share of national income since the 1970s derived from the declining political and economic power of labor as capital mobilized technologies, unemployment, off-shoring and anti-labor politics (such as those of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) to crush all opposition. As Alan Budd, an economic advisor to Margaret Thatcher confessed in an unguarded moment, anti-inflation policies of the 1980s turned out to be "a very good way to raise unemployment, and raising unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes…what was engineered there in Marxist terms was a crisis of capitalism which recreated a reserve army of labour and has allowed capitalists to make high profits ever since." The disparity in remuneration between average workers and CEO's stood at around thirty to one in 1970. It now is well above three hundred to one and in the case of MacDonalds about 1200 to one.

But in Volume 2 of Marx's Capital (which Piketty also has not read even as he cheerfully dismisses it) Marx pointed out that capital's penchant for driving wages down would at some point restrict the capacity of the market to absorb capital's product. Henry Ford recognized this dilemma long ago when he mandated the $5 eight-hour day for his workers in order, he said, to boost consumer demand. Many thought that lack of effective demand underpinned the Great Depression of the 1930s. This inspired Keynesian expansionary policies after World War Two and resulted in some reductions in inequalities of incomes (though not so much of wealth) in the midst of strong demand led growth. But this solution rested on the relative empowerment of labor and the construction of the "social state" (Piketty's term) funded by progressive taxation. "All told," he writes, "over the period 1932-1980, nearly half a century, the top federal income tax in the United States averaged 81 percent." And this did not in any way dampen growth (another piece of Piketty's evidence that rebuts right wing beliefs).

By the end of the 1960s it became clear to many capitalists that they needed to do something about the excessive power of labor. Hence the demotion of Keynes from the pantheon of respectable economists, the switch to the supply side thinking of Milton Friedman, the crusade to stabilize if not reduce taxation, to deconstruct the social state and to discipline the forces of labor. After 1980 top tax rates came down and capital gains – a major source of income for the ultra-wealthy – were taxed at a much lower rate in the US, hugely boosting the flow of wealth to the top one percent. But the impact on growth, Piketty shows, was negligible. So "trickle down" of benefits from the rich to the rest (another right wing favorite belief) does not work. None of this was dictated by any mathematical law. It was all about politics.

But then the wheel turned full circle and the more pressing question became: where is the demand? Piketty systematically ignores this question. The 1990s fudged the answer by a vast expansion of credit, including the extension of mortgage finance into sub-prime markets. But the resultant asset bubble was bound to go pop as it did in 2007-8 bringing down Lehman Brothers and the credit system with it. However, profit rates and the further concentration of private wealth recovered very quickly after 2009 while everything and everyone else did badly. Profit rates of businesses are now as high as they have ever been in the US. Businesses are sitting on oodles of cash and refuse to spend it because market conditions are not robust.

Piketty's formulation of the mathematical law disguises more than it reveals about the class politics involved. As Warren Buffett has noted, "sure there is class war, and it is my class, the rich, who are making it and we are winning." One key measure of their victory is the growing disparities in wealth and income of the top one percent relative to everyone else.

There is, however, a central difficulty with Piketty's argument. It rests on a mistaken definition of capital. Capital is a process not a thing. It is a process of circulation in which money is used to make more money often, but not exclusively through the exploitation of labor power. Piketty defines capital as the stock of all assets held by private individuals, corporations and governments that can be traded in the market no matter whether these assets are being used or not. This includes land, real estate and intellectual property rights as well as my art and jewelry collection. How to determine the value of all of these things is a difficult technical problem that has no agreed upon solution. In order to calculate a meaningful rate of return, r, we have to have some way of valuing the initial capital. Unfortunately there is no way to value it independently of the value of the goods and services it is used to produce or how much it can be sold for in the market. The whole of neo-classical economic thought (which is the basis of Piketty's thinking) is founded on a tautology. The rate of return on capital depends crucially on the rate of growth because capital is valued by way of that which it produces and not by what went into its production. Its value is heavily influenced by speculative conditions and can be seriously warped by the famous "irrational exuberance" that Greenspan spotted as characteristic of stock and housing markets. If we subtract housing and real estate – to say nothing of the value of the art collections of the hedge funders – from the definition of capital (and the rationale for their inclusion is rather weak) then Piketty's explanation for increasing disparities in wealth and income would fall flat on its face, though his descriptions of the state of past and present inequalities would still stand.

Money, land, real estate and plant and equipment that are not being used productively are not capital. If the rate of return on the capital that is being used is high then this is because a part of capital is withdrawn from circulation and in effect goes on strike. Restricting the supply of capital to new investment (a phenomena we are now witnessing) ensures a high rate of return on that capital which is in circulation. The creation of such artificial scarcity is not only what the oil companies do to ensure their high rate of return: it is what all capital does when given the chance. This is what underpins the tendency for the rate of return on capital (no matter how it is defined and measured) to always exceed the rate of growth of income. This is how capital ensures its own reproduction, no matter how uncomfortable the consequences are for the rest of us. And this is how the capitalist class lives.

There is much that is valuable in Piketty's data sets. But his explanation as to why the inequalities and oligarchic tendencies arise is seriously flawed. His proposals as to the remedies for the inequalities are naïve if not utopian. And he has certainly not produced a working model for capital of the twenty-first century. For that we still need Marx or his modern-day equivalent.


David Harvey is a Distinguished Professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. His most recent book is Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, published by Profile Press in London and Oxford University Press in New York.

Sunday, February 2, 2014

Panic About World Deflation

Commentary No. 370, Feb. 1, 2014

Not so long ago, the pundits and the investors saw the "emerging markets" – a euphemism for China, India, Brazil, and some others – as the rescuers of the world-economy. They were the ones that would sustain growth, and therefore capital accumulation, when the United States, the European Union, and Japan were all faltering in their previous and traditional role as the mainstays of the world capitalist system.

So it is quite striking when, in the last two weeks of January, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Main St, the Financial Times (FT), Bloomberg, the New York Times (NYT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) all sound the alarm about the "collapse" of these same emerging markets, worrying in particular about deflation, which might be "contagious." It sounds like barely contained panic to me.

First, a word about deflation. A "calm" market is one in which nominal prices do not go down, and only creep up slowly. This enables sellers and buyers to predict with reasonable confidence what decisions are optimal for them. World markets have not been calm in this sense for some while. Many analysts date the decline of such calm from the 2008 turn in U.S. mortgage markets. I myself see the decline of such calm as beginning in the period 1967-1973 and continuing ever since.

The market is not calm if there is either significant deflation or significant inflation. These are really the same thing in their impact on real employment figures and therefore on world effective demand for production of all sorts. Whether real world employment goes down for one or the other reason, there is both acute real suffering for the vast majority of the world's population and a vast increase in uncertainty, which tends to freeze further productive investment, which leads to more suffering and more freezing. It is a vicious circle.

To be sure, some large capitalists are able to take advantage of the situation through canny financial manipulations involving speculation. Their problem is that they are taking a big gamble – either massive appreciation of their assets or bankruptcy. Still, at the very least these manipulators have a chance to gain massively. The majority of the world's population are fairly sure to lose, often massively.

What is in these panic reports? Michael Arnold in the WSJ asks, "Will selloff push emerging market central banks to raise rates?" He says that the turmoil was caused by "disappointing growth figures" for China and Argentina's devaluation of its currency. Arnold particularly worries about India and Indonesia, which have "large debt loads and heavy dependence on foreign lending," and therefore are moving to curb inflation. He mentions Turkey as another problem zone.

Hal M. Bundrick in Main St emphasizes contagion. He cites both shifting U.S. monetary policy and concerns for the Chinese economy plus political turmoil in Turkey, Argentina, and Ukraine as "hastening the decline." He cites a Russian banker about the fall of the ruble and an atmosphere "close to panic." He says this panic is "crossing over from emerging to developed [markets] in terms of sentiments."

Gavyn Davies in FT headlines his story, "Will the emerging world derail the global recovery?" He says that emerging currencies have been "in free fall." He too sees Chinese slowdown as the key issue, in particular via its impact on "supplier economies" (that is, countries that sell primary products to China) – in particular Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. He says the "pain of a credit bubble" is not only China's problem but that of Turkey, India, and Indonesia. If the Chinese decrease in growth goes much further, it would threaten "renewed global recession." Ending on a mildly optimistic note, he immediately takes it back by saying that his simulations (the basis of his mild optimism) are based on old patterns that may no longer hold.

Ralph Atkins in FT talks of "the spectre of deflation." Deflation, even if positive in the short term, is "definitely negative for equities" over the longer run. His particular worry seems to be the euro zone. Having cited the reasons of others to see the brighter side, he ends by saying, "the spectre of deflation wore its invisibility cloak."

And none less that Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, told the assembled Establishment figures at the World Economic Forum in Davos that there is a global market threat as the United States cuts back its cash stimulus. There is a "new risk on the horizon and it needs to be closely watched." She cites the "spillover effects…in emerging markets."

That same week, Bloomberg had an editorial that began, "Emerging-market economies had a brutal week." They see the emerging markets as too tied to the U.S. dollar and therefore "unduly sensitive to fluctuations – real or imagined – in U.S. monetary policy." So they preach to the U.S. Fed not to "taper too soon" and predictably to the emerging countries to "improve their policies."

And not least, Landon Thomas in the NYT informs us that the latest buzzword on Wall Street, replacing BRICS, is "the Fragile Five." This list includes three BRICS members (Brazil, India, South Africa), plus Turkey and Indonesia. It leaves off both China and Russia, whose geopolitical clout seems to weigh heavily on the scales.

Everyone seems to proffer good advice, sure that it will somehow palliate the situation. Few seem to be ready to admit that global effective demand is the real problem. But one senses that, just below the surface, they understand this. This is why they panic, because then their whole emphasis on "growth" – a cardinal faith – is undermined. In that case, the crisis becomes not cyclical but structural, to which one has to respond not with palliation but with inventing a new system. This is the famous bifurcation in which there are two possible outcomes – one better and one worse than the existing system, one in which we are all involved as players.