Σταύρος Λυγερός: Γιατί με έδιωξαν από την «Καθημερινή»

Λίγες μέρες μετά την αποχώρησή του από την Καθημερινή, ο δημοσιογράφος Σταύρος Λυγερός μιλάει στο thepressproject και στη δημοσιογράφο Ντίνα Καράτζιου και εξηγεί γιατί στην παρούσα συγκυρία «η κοινωνία έχει ανάγκη από πραγματική δημοσιογραφία». Συνέντευξη στην Ντίνα Καράτζιου  Ο Σταύρος Λυγερός σχολιάζει τον «παρασιτικό ρόλο του Τύπου στην Ελλάδα της κλεπτοκρατίας», και αναλύει πως τα media «έγιναν οι θεραπαινίδες της πολιτικής εξουσίας και της ολιγαρχίας του χρήματος». Το «αμαρτωλό τρίγωνο», όπως το αποκαλεί, που αποτέλεσε τη βασική αιτία για την ανάπτυξη της διαπλοκής στην Ελλάδα. Στο σήμερα, εξηγεί πως τα media εκτελώντας αποστολή εφάρμοσαν «τη συνταγή» της διαχείρισης του φόβου με στόχο να επιβάλλουν ως μονόδρομο τις πολιτικές της τρόικας. Τέλος, αναλύει πώς το τοπίο στο χώρο του Τύπου μεταλλάσεται ραγδαία λόγω της κρίσης και ευελπιστεί ότι πέρα από τα media που θα εκφράσουν τους νέους πόλους πολιτικοοικονομικής εξουσίας, θα βρεί δυναμικό τρόπο έκφρασης και εκείνη η δημοσιογραφία, η οποία θα προασπίσει τα συμφέροντα της κοινωνίας. - Πρόσφατα διακόπηκε η συνεργασίας σας με την εφημερίδα Καθημερινή, στην οποία αρθρογραφούσατε επί σειρά ετών. Κλείνει ένας κύκλος; Στην Καθημερινή πήγα το 1989. Δούλεψα σ΄ αυτή την εφημερίδα περισσότερα από 23 χρόνια, το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της δημοσιογραφικής μου σταδιοδρομίας. Δεν θα ήθελα να σχολιάσω τους λόγους της αποχώρησής μου, νομίζω ότι ο καθένας μπορεί να τους δει. Είναι εξόφθαλμοι. Σ' αυτές τις περιπτώσεις υπάρχει πάντα η ουσία, δηλαδή η διακοπή της συνεργασίας, η οποία έγινε με πρωτοβουλία της εφημερίδας. Υπάρχει, βεβαίως και ο τρόπος. Το μόνο που θα πω γι' αυτόν είναι ότι δεν ήταν ο καλύτερος. - Μετά την αποχώρηση σας, γράφτηκαν εκατοντάδες θετικά σχόλια στα social media από πολίτες. Πως το σχολιάζετε; Με συγκίνησαν. Είμαι παλιομοδίτης. Δίνω σημασία στα σχόλια των αναγνωστών. Έχει σημασία η γνώμη που έχουν οι άλλοι για σένα. Δεν ανήκω, όμως, στους δημοσιογράφους οι οποίοι κάνουν θέμα τον εαυτό τους. - Συμφωνείτε ότι η κρίση στον Τύπο πριν γίνει και οικονομική ήταν βασικά δεοντολογική; Πάντα ο Τύπος είχε κάποιου είδους διαπλοκή με την πολιτική και με τα οικονομικά συμφέροντα. Η διαφορά του σήμερα από το χθες είναι ότι παλαιότερα οι εφημερίδες στηρίζονταν στην κυκλοφορία τους. Αρα είχαν μία κάποια οικονομική ανεξαρτησία, επειδή η κυκλοφορία ήταν η κύρια πηγή των εσόδων τους. Σταδιακά, κύρια πηγή των εσόδων έγινε η διαφήμιση. Πρόκειται για ποιοτική διαφορά. Η διαπλοκή απέκτησε νέο περιεχόμενο. Για την ακρίβεια, τα media έπαψαν να είναι προσκολημμένα σε κόμματα και έγιναν θεραπαινίδες της ολιγαρχίας του χρήματος. Η ίδια η πολιτική εξουσία, άλλωστε, έχασε σε μεγάλο βαθμό την αυτονομία της. Σταδιακά διαμορφώθηκε το αμαρτωλό τρίγωνο. Η ισχυρή κορυφή είναι η ολιγαρχία χρήματος με τις δύο άλλες κορυφές, την πολιτική εξουσία και τα media, να λειτουργούν περισσότερο δορυφορικά παρά ανταγωνιστικά. Στην προ κρίσης Ελλάδα, αυτό το αμαρτωλό τρίγωνο λειτούργησε σαν καρκίνωμα, ήταν στυλοβάτης του μοντέλου πλασματικής ανάπτυξης, βασικά χαρακτηριστικά του οποίου ήταν όχι μόνο ο παρασιτισμός, η σπατάλη και ο ανορθολογισμός, αλλά και η κλεπτοκρατία. Η κρίση έβγαλε όλα αυτά στην επιφάνεια και τους προσέδωσε μία άλλη διάσταση. Όταν το μοντέλο πλασματικής ανάπτυξης δεν μπορούσε να χρηματοδοτηθεί κατέρρευσε, συμπαρασύροντας και το ανομολόγητο κοινωνικό συμβόλαιο ανάμεσα στην άρχουσα τάξη και στη μικρομεσαία θάλασσα. Το περιεχόμενο αυτού του συμβολαίου συνοψίζεται στο εξής μήνυμα που εξέπεμπε η άρχουσα τάξη: «Μην ασχολείστε με τα χρυσοφόρα παιχνίδια διαπλοκής που λαμβάνουν χώρα στην κορυφή της κοινωνικής πυραμίδας και το πολιτικό σύστημα θα κάνει τα στραβά μάτια για τη διαφθορά στη δημόσια διοίκηση, για την εκτεταμένη φοροδιαφυγή στους μικρομεσαίους για την αυθαίρετη δόμηση και για διάφορα άλλα ανομικά φαινόμενα. Όταν ακυρώθηκε αυτό το ανομολόγητο κοινωνικό συμβόλαιο, συμπαρέσυρε, όπως έδειξαν και οι εκλογές του περασμένου Μαϊου-Ιουνίου το πολιτικό σύστημα που στηρίχθηκε στον δικομματισμό. Με άλλα λόγια, έχουμε τέλος εποχής, γύρισμα σελίδας. - Σ' αυτή τη νέα εποχή, φαίνεται ότι αλλάζουν και οι συσχετισμοί των πολιτικοοικονομικών συμφερόντων. Πώς επηρεάζει αυτό τη δημοσιογραφία; Πριν μιλήσουμε για τα media, επιτρέψτε μου ένα σχόλιο για τον συσχετισμό πολιτικής και οικονομίας. Η ελληνική άρχουσα τάξη έχει μακρά παράδοση εξάρτησης. Όταν έφερε τη χώρα στον γκρεμό, στις αρχές του 2010, τι έκανε; Αντί έστω και την τελευταία στιγμή να επεξεργαστεί ένα εναλλακτικό εθνικό σχέδιο εξόδου από την κρίση, αντί να διαπραγματευτεί με την τρόικα ένα βιώσιμο πρόγραμμα ανάταξης της ελληνικής οικονομίας, τα παρέδωσε όλα, έτρεξε να κρυφτεί στην ποδιά των ξένων κηδεμόνων. Οι πιο θρασείς, μάλιστα, κουνάνε το δάχτυλο στην κοινωνία. Η άρχουσα τάξη νόμιζε ότι οι δανειστές θα βάλουν χέρι μόνο στη δημόσια περιουσία. Τώρα αρχίζει να καταλαβαίνει ότι θα βάλουν χέρι και στις εξασθενημένες από την ύφεση ιδιωτικές επιχειρήσεις. Η εσωτερική υποτίμηση, την οποία τόσο ύμνησαν, έχει κι αυτή τη διάσταση. Οι δανειστές θα βάλουν χέρι και στις τράπεζες και μέσω των τραπεζών θα ελέγξουν και τα media. Τέρμα οι προνομιακές δανειοδοτήσεις. Τα παραπάνω θεωρώ ότι έχουν μεγάλη σημασία για να δούμε τον ρόλο των μέχρι τώρα κυρίαρχων media. Σας θυμίζω ότι ένα μεγάλο δημοσιογραφικό συγκρότημα από στυλοβάτης των Μνημονίων ξαφνικά ξιφουλκεί εναντίον της τρόικας. Μόνο που είναι αργά. Η κοινωνία δεν πρόκειται να συνταχθεί μαζί τους για να προασπίσει σκανδαλώδη προνόμια. Ίσως αυτή να είναι η θετική πλευρά ενός αρνητικού φαινομένου. - Τι μπορεί να προκύψει λοιπόν, μέσα από αυτή την καταλυτική κρίση για τον Τύπο; Δεν μου αρέσει να κάνω τον μάντη. Αυτό που μπορώ να πω είναι ότι η κοινωνία έχει ανάγκη από πραγματική δημοσιογραφία. Έχει ανάγκη δηλαδή, από τις βασικές λειτουργίες που χαρακτηρίζουν τη δημοσιογραφία: Το ρεπορτάζ και την έρευνα, την ανάλυση και το σχόλιο. Δεν έχει σημασία αν τα είδη αυτά της δημοσιογραφίας θα εμφανισθούν σε εφημερίδες, σε ραδιοφωνικούς και τηλεοπτικούς σταθμούς ή στο Διαδίκτυο. Αυτά είναι οχήματα της δημοσιογραφίας. Το ζητούμενο είναι η ποιότητα. Και η ποιότητα δεν εξασφαλίζεται με τη νοοτροπία του τζάμπα. - Εννοείτε την απλήρωτη ή την κακοπληρωμένη δημοσιογραφική εργασία; Βεβαίως κι αυτή. Η δημοσιογραφική παραγωγή είναι ένα προϊόν. Κάποιοι εργάζονται για να προκύψει ένα ρεπορτάζ, μία έρευνα, μία newsanalysis, ένα σχόλιο. Κι αυτοί πρέπει να πληρωθούν. Όποιος έχει την απαίτηση ή απλώς έχει εθισθεί να να βρίσκει τα πάντα τζάμπα στο Διαδίκτυο υπονομεύει την ανεξαρτησία της δημοσιογραφίας. Ο δημοσιογράφος που δεν πληρώνεται από τους αναγνώστες ή ακροατές ή τηλεθεατές του ή γρήγορα θα εγκαταλείψει τη δημοσιογραφία ή θα συνεχίσει, επειδή πληρώνεται από αλλού, απ' όσους ενδιαφέρονται να διαμορφώνουν την κοινή γνώμη σύμφωνα με τα συμφέροντά τους. Οποιος θέλει να έχει ένα ποιοτικό δημοσιογραφικό προϊόν με απαιτήσεις ανεξαρτησίας, πρέπει να αντιληφθεί ότι δεν μπορεί να το έχει τζάμπα. - Βλέπετε λοιπόν μία δημοσιογραφία που θα συνταχθεί πίσω από το νέο πολιτικοοικονομικό κατεστημένο, ή μία δυναμική ανεξάρτητη δημοσιογραφία που θα εκφράζει την κοινωνία; Το μόνο σίγουρο σήμερα είναι ότι το παραδοσιακό συγκρότημα εξουσίας αποδομείται. Θα προκύψει ένα νέο, το οποίο ακόμη δεν έχει διαμορφωθεί. Η εξέλιξη αυτή θα επηρεάσει αποφασιστικά και τα media. Το νέο τοπίο στα media δεν είναι σίγουρο ότι θα είναι καλύτερο. Θα εξαρτηθεί από την τροπή που θα πάρουν οι εξελίξεις στο πολιτικό επίπεδο. Μην ξεχνάμε ότι βρισκόμαστε σε ιστορική καμπή. Η ολιγαρχία του χρήματος προσπαθεί να "κινεζοποιήσει" την Ευρώπη, να καταλύσει το σοσιαλδημοκρατικό μοντέλο και το Κοινωνικό Κράτος. Η αρχή έγινε από τον πιο αδύναμο κρίκο, την Ελλάδα, την οποία έχουν μετατρέψει σε πειραματόζωο. Το κρίσιμο ερώτημα είναι αν θα υπάρξει μία δημοσιογραφία, η οποία να εκφράσει την αντίσταση της κοινωνίας. Το ελπίζω, αλλά κρατάω μικρό καλάθι. Η πείρα του παρελθόντος δείχνει ότι οι καλές προθέσεις δεν αρκούν. Η αναδιάταξη της άρχουσας τάξης θα επιφέρει και μία αναδιάταξη στην "καθεστωτική" δημοσιογραφία. Αυτοί που έχουν τα χρήματα μπορούν εύκολα και να μεταλλάξουν παραδοσιακά μιντιακά συγκροτήματα ή ακόμα και να δημιουργήσουν νέα. - Και μία που μιλάμε για "καθεστωτικά" media , πώς αυτά εκβίασαν μια ολόκληρη κοινωνία, προβάλλοντας σαν μονόδρομο την πολιτική της τρόικας; Τα media διεκπεραιώνουν τη θεραπεία-σοκ στο ιδεολογικό και επικοινωνιακό επίπεδο. Λειτουργούν ως μηχανισμός για την επιβολή των εκβιαστικών διλημμάτων στην κοινωνία. Μετατρέπουν ζωτικής σημασία πολιτικά ζητήματα σε αναμφισβήτητο μονόδρομο, σβήνοντας κάθε δυνατότητα εναλλακτικής λύσης στο επικοινωνιακό επίπεδο. Το κατάφεραν με όπλο τους την καλλιέργεια του φόβου. Είναι οι διαχειριστές του φόβου. Η συνταγή, βεβαίως, δεν είναι δική τους. Έχει έρθει ντελίβερι. Όταν την άνοιξη του 2010 πρωτοτέθηκε το δίλημμα "Μνημόνιο ή χρεοκοπία", η ελληνική κοινωνία υπέκυψε. Φοβήθηκε τότε ότι κινδύνευε να χάσει μισθούς, συντάξεις, και καταθέσεις. Αποδέχθηκε, λοιπόν, κάποιες περικοπές, ελπίζοντας ότι σύντομα η κρίση θα ήταν παρελθόν. Μας έλεγαν ότι στα τέλη του 2011 ή στις αρχές του 2012 η Ελλάδα θα έχει επανέλθει σε θετικούς ρυθμούς ανάπτυξης και θα έχει επιστρέψει στις Αγορές. Με την πάροδο του χρόνου, τα οικονομικά και κοινωνικά ερείπια συσσωρεύονταν. Η ελπίδα μαραίνεται και αντικαθίσταται από απόγνωση. Κι όσο η απόγνωση συσσωρεύεται τόσο μετατρέπεται σε οργή. Στην προσπάθειά της να ανασχέσει τη λαϊκή οργή, η "παράταξη του Μνημονίου" επιστράτευσε την ιδεολογική ηγεμονία του ευρώ. - Αυτός είναι ο λόγος που οι κοινωνικές αντιδράσεις παραμένουν συγκριτικά υποτονικές; Η απειλή εξόδου της Ελλάδας από το ευρώ έπαιξε ανασχετικό ρόλο, αλλά δεν πιστεύω ότι αυτή είναι η κύρια αιτία της υποτονικότητας. Θυμίζω το κίνημα των Αγανακτισμένων, που το 2011 προσέλαβε μεγάλες διαστάσεις. Το κίνημα αυτό ξεθύμανε, επειδή δεν έβγαζε πουθενά. Δεν συμμερίζομαι την εκτίμηση ότι η κοινωνία υποτάχτηκε. Ισχυρίζομαι ότι αυτά το κίνημα των Αγανακτισμένων ήταν η ύστατη προσπάθεια της κοινωνίας να αντιμετωπίσει την επίθεση που δέχεται με ειρηνικές διαμαρτυρίες, ήταν η ύστατη κραυγή απόγνωσης. Σήμερα, η μεγάλη μάζα δεν συμμετέχει στις διαδηλώσεις, επειδή έχει πεισθεί ότι δεν μπορούν να επηρεάσουν την ασκούμενη πολιτική. Και δεν μπορούν να επηρεάσουν, επειδή τη χώρα δεν την κυβερνάει η κυβέρνηση, αλλά η τρόικα. Προς το παρόν, οι πολίτες προσπαθούν να επιβιώσουν. Μην έχετε, όμως, αμφιβολία ότι όσο η κοινωνική οργή συσσωρεύεται χωρίς να εκδηλώνεται τόσο πιο πιθανή γίνεται μία τυφλή κοινωνική έκρηξη. Έκρηξη, η οποία μπορεί να προέλθει από ασήμαντη αφορμή, από ένα λάθος σφύριγμα διαιτητή! Όταν έχεις μία χύτρα με νερό στη φωτιά και είναι ερμητικά κλειστή, δεν ξέρεις πότε θα εκραγεί. Αλλά ξέρεις ότι αν την αφήσεις στη φωτιά, κάποια στιγμή θα εκραγεί. - Το τελευταίο σας βιβλίο έχει τίτλο "Από την Κλεπτοκρατία στη Χρεοκοπία". Πως το εμπνευστήκατε; Δεν θα το είχα γράψει αν δεν πίστευα βαθιά ότι η κρίση είναι πρωτογενώς πολιτική και δευτερογενώς οικονομική. Με την ίδια ακριβώς λογική βαθύτατα πιστεύω ότι η έξοδος από την κρίση θα ξεκινήσει μόνο από μία ριζική αλλαγή στο πολιτικό επίπεδο. Ακόμα και το καλύτερο σκάφος δεν μπορεί να πλεύσει στην τρικυμία χωρίς καλό καπετάνιο. Το βιβλίο μου εξετάζει και την εγχώρια πτυχή της κρίσης, για την οποία σας έχω ήδη μιλήσει, αλλά και τη διεθνή και ευρωπαϊκή πτυχή. Συνήθως, οι μνημονιακοί στρέφουν τους προβολείς στην εγχώρια πτυχή της κρίσης, κατηγορώντας τον λαό για ασωτεία. Αντιθέτως, η Αριστερά έχει την τάση να φωτίζει μόνο τη διεθνή και ευρωπαϊκή πτυχή της κρίσης. Η πραγματικότητα είναι ότι οι δικές μας πολλές και μεγάλες παθογένειες κατέστησαν την Ελλάδα τον πιο αδύναμο κρίκο της καθόλου στέρεης ευρωπαϊκής αλυσίδας και ως τέτοιο την μετέτρεψαν σε πειραματόζωο. Η Ελλάδα είναι πρωτοπόρος όσον αφορά την εφαρμογή της συνταγής. Το σήμερα της Ελλάδας είναι το αύριο των άλλων κοινωνιών της ευρωπαϊκής περιφέρειας, αλλά και το μεθαύριο των κοινωνιών του ευρωπαϊκού πυρήνα. Όπως είπα παραπάνω, η ολιγαρχία του χρήματος μεθοδεύει την "κινεζοποίηση" της Ευρώπης όσον αφορά την εργασία. - Πως λειτούργησε η δημοσιογραφία στο περιβάλλον της κλεπτοκρατίας; Αν είχαμε περιουσιολόγιο, θα βλέπαμε ότι ορισμένοι δημοσιογράφοι, που πριν από 20 ή 30 χρόνια ήταν μάλλον φτωχοί, σήμερα είναι μάλλον πλούσιοι. Κι όχι από τις αμοιβές τους. Τα media ως σύνολα, αλλά και μεμονωμένοι δημοσιογράφοι έπαιξαν επικερδώς ρόλο μεσάζοντα σε χρυσοφόρα παιχνίδια διαπλοκής. Από οικονομικής απόψεως λειτούργησαν σαν παράσιτα και από θεσμικής ως υπονομευτές του Κράτους Δικαίου και κατ' επέκταση της δημοκρατίας.

Peter Turchin – The history of inequality

Today, the top one per cent of incomes in the United States accounts for one fifth of US earnings. The top one per cent of fortunes holds two-fifths of the total wealth. Just one rich family, the six heirs of the brothers Sam and James Walton, founders of Walmart, are worth more than the bottom 40 per cent of the American population combined ($115 billion in 2012).

After thousands of scholarly and popular articles on the topic, one might think we would have a pretty good idea why the richest people in the US are pulling away from the rest. But it seems we don't. As the Congressional Budget Office concluded in 2011: 'the precise reasons for the rapid growth in income at the top are not well understood'. Some commentators point to economic factors, some to politics, and others again to culture. Yet obviously enough, all these factors must interact in complex ways. What is slightly less obvious is how a very long historical perspective can help us to see the whole mechanism.

In his book Wealth and Democracy (2002), Kevin Phillips came up with a useful way of thinking about the changing patterns of wealth inequality in the US. He looked at the net wealth of the nation's median household and compared it with the size of the largest fortune in the US. The ratio of the two figures provided a rough measure of wealth inequality, and that's what he tracked, touching down every decade or so from the turn of the 19th century all the way to the present. In doing so, he found a striking pattern.

We found repeated back-and-forth swings in demographic, economic, social, and political structures

From 1800 to the 1920s, inequality increased more than a hundredfold. Then came the reversal: from the 1920s to 1980, it shrank back to levels not seen since the mid-19th century. Over that time, the top fortunes hardly grew (from one to two billion dollars; a decline in real terms). Yet the wealth of a typical family increased by a multiple of 40. From 1980 to the present, the wealth gap has been on another steep, if erratic, rise. Commentators have called the period from 1920s to 1970s the 'great compression'. The past 30 years are known as the 'great divergence'. Bring the 19th century into the picture, however, and one sees not isolated movements so much as a rhythm. In other words, when looked at over a long period, the development of wealth inequality in the US appears to be cyclical. And if it's cyclical, we can predict what happens next.

An obvious objection presents itself at this point. Does observing just one and a half cycles really show that there is a regular pattern in the dynamics of inequality? No, by itself it doesn't. But this is where looking at other historical societies becomes interesting. In our book Secular Cycles (2009), Sergey Nefedov and I applied the Phillips approach to England, France and Russia throughout both the medieval and early modern periods, and also to ancient Rome. All of these societies (and others for which information was patchier) went through recurring 'secular' cycles, which is to say, very long ones. Over periods of two to three centuries, we found repeated back-and-forth swings in demographic, economic, social, and political structures. And the cycles of inequality were an integral part of the overall motion.

Incidentally, when students of dynamical systems (or, more colourfully, 'chaoticians' such as Jeff Goldblum's character in the film Jurassic Park) talk about 'cycles', we do not mean rigid, mechanical, clock-like movements. Cycles in the real world are chaotic, because complex systems such as human societies have many parts that are constantly moving and influencing each other. Despite this complexity, our historical research on Rome, England, France, Russia and now the US shows that these complex interactions add together to a general rhythm. Upward trends in variables (for example, economic inequality) alternate with downward trends. And most importantly, the ways in which other parts of the system move can tell us why certain trends periodically reverse themselves. Understanding (and perhaps even forecasting) such trend-reversals is at the core of the new discipline of cliodynamics, which looks at history through the lens of mathematical modelling.

So it looks like the pattern that we see in the US is real. Ours is, of course, a very different society from ancient Rome or medieval England. It is cut off from them by the Industrial Revolution and by innumerable advances in technology since then. Even so, a historically based model might shed light on what has been happening in the US over the past three decades.

First, we need to think about jobs. Unless other forces intervene, an overabundance of labour will tend to drive down its price, which naturally means that workers and their families have less to live on. One of the most important forces affecting the labour supply in the US has been immigration, and it turns out that immigration, as measured by the proportion of the population who were born abroad, has changed in a cyclical manner just like inequality. In fact, the periods of high immigration coincided with the periods of stagnating wages. The Great Compression, meanwhile, unfolded under a low-immigration regime. This tallies with work by the Harvard economist George Borjas, who argues that immigration plays an important role in depressing wages, especially for those unskilled workers who compete most directly with new arrivals.

Immigration is only one part of a complex story. Another reason why the labour supply in the US went up in the 19th century is, not to put too fine a point on it, sex. The native-born population was growing at what were, at the time, unprecedented rates: a 2.9 per cent growth per year in the 1800s, only gradually declining after that. By 1850 there was no available farmland in Eastern Seaboard states. Many from that 'population surplus' moved west, but others ended up in eastern cities where, of course, they competed for jobs with new immigrants.

This connection between the oversupply of labour and plummeting living standards for the poor is one of the more robust generalisations in history. Consider the case of medieval England. The population of England doubled between 1150 and 1300. There was little possibility of overseas emigration, so the 'surplus' peasants flocked to the cities, causing the population of London to balloon from 20,000 to 80,000. Too many hungry mouths and too many idle hands resulted in a fourfold increase in food prices and a halving of real wages. Then, when a series of horrible epidemics, starting with the Black Death of 1348, carried away more than half of the population, the same dynamic ran in reverse. The catastrophe, paradoxically, introduced a Golden Age for common people. Real wages tripled and living standards went up, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Common people relied less on bread, gorging themselves instead on meat, fish, and dairy products.

The tug of war between the top and typical incomes doesn't have to be a zero-sum game, but in practice it often is

Much the same pattern can be seen during the secular cycle of the Roman Principate. The population of the Roman Empire grew rapidly during the first two centuries up to 165AD. Then came a series of deadly epidemics, known as the Antonine Plague. In Roman Egypt, for which we have contemporary data thanks to preserved papyri, real wages first fell (when the population increased) and then regained ground (when the population collapsed). We also know that many grain fields were converted to orchards and vineyards following the plagues. The implication is that the standard of life for common people improved — they ate less bread, more fruit, and drank wine. The gap between common people and the elites shrank.

Naturally, the conditions affecting the labour supply were different in the second half of the 20th century in the US. An important new element was globalisation, which allows corporations to move jobs to poorer countries (with that 'giant sucking sound', as Ross Perot put it during his 1992 presidential campaign). But none of this alters the fact that an oversupply of labour tends to depress wages for the poorer section of the population. And just as in Roman Egypt, the poor in the US today eat more energy-dense foods — bread, pasta, and potatoes — while the wealthy eat more fruit and drink wine.

Falling wages isn't the only reason why labour oversupply leads to inequality. As the slice of the economic pie going to employees diminishes, the share going to employers goes up. Periods of rapid growth for top fortunes are commonly associated with stagnating incomes for the majority. Equally, when worker incomes grew in the Great Compression, top fortunes actually declined in real terms. The tug of war between the top and typical incomes doesn't have to be a zero-sum game, but in practice it often is. And so in 13th-century England, as the overall population doubles, we find landowners charging peasants higher rents and paying less in wages: the immiseration of the general populace translates into a Golden Age for the aristocrats.

As the historian Christopher Dyer wrote, life was good for the upper-crust English around 1300. They drank more wine and spent their spare cash building or refurbishing castles, cathedrals, and monasteries. They didn't just enjoy a better living standard; they also grew in number. For example, the number of knights and esquires tripled between 1200 and 1300. But disaster struck in 1348, when the Black Death removed the population surplus (and then some). By the 15th century, while the common people were enjoying their own Golden Age, the aristocracy had fallen on hard times. We can infer the severity of their financial straits from the amount of claret imported from France. Only the gentry drank wine, and around 1300, England imported 20,000 tuns or casks of it from France per year. By 1460, this declined to only 5,000. In the mid-15th century, there were simply fewer aristocrats and they were much poorer.

In the US between around 1870 and 1900, there was another Golden Age for the elites, appropriately called the Gilded Age. While living standards for the majority declined (seen vividly in dwindling average heights and life expectancies), the moneyed classes were enjoying ever more luxurious lifestyles. And just like in 13th-century England, the total number of the wealthy was shooting up. Between 1825 and 1900, the number of millionaires (in constant 1900 dollars) went from 2.5 per million of the population to 19 per million. In our current cycle, the proportion of decamillionaires (those whose net worth exceeds 10 million in 1995 dollars) grew tenfold between 1992 and 2007 — from 0.04 to 0.4 per cent of the US population.

This seems like a peculiar development. The reason for it — cheeringly enough, you might say — is that cheap labour allows many enterprising, hard-working or simply lucky members of the poorer classes to climb into the ranks of the wealthy. In the 19th century, a skilled artisan in the US could expand his workshop by hiring other workers, eventually becoming the owner of a large business; Sven Beckert's The Monied Metropolis (2003) describes many instances of this story playing out. In America today, enterprising and hard-working individuals start dotcom companies or claw their way into jobs as the CEOs of large corporations.

On the face of it, this is a wonderful testament to merit-based upward mobility. But there are side effects. Don't forget that most people are stuck with stagnant or falling real wages. Upward mobility for a few hollows out the middle class and causes the social pyramid to become top-heavy. Too many elites relative to the general population (a condition I call 'elite overproduction') leads to ever-stiffer rivalry in the upper echelons. And then you get trouble.

In the US, there is famously a close connection between wealth and power. Many well-off individuals — typically not the founders of great fortunes but their children and grandchildren — choose to enter politics (Mitt Romney is a convenient example, though the Kennedy clan also comes to mind). Yet the number of political offices is fixed: there are only so many senators and representatives at the federal and state levels, and only one US president. As the ranks of the wealthy swell, so too do the numbers of wealthy aspirants for the finite supply of political positions.

When watching political battles in today's Senate, it is hard not to think about their parallels in Republican Rome. The population of Italy roughly doubled during the second century BC, while the number of aristocrats increased even more. Again, the supply of political offices was fixed — there were 300 places in the senate and membership was for life. By the end of the century, competition for influence had turned ugly. During the Gracchan period (139—110BC), political feuding led to the slaughter of the tribunes Tiberius and Gaius on the streets of Rome. During the next century, intra-elite conflict spilt out of Rome into Italy and then into the broader Mediterranean. The civil wars of the first century BC, fuelled by a surplus of politically ambitious aristocrats, ultimately caused the fall of the Republic and the establishment of the Empire.

Beside sheer numbers, there is a further, subtler factor that aggravates internal class rivalry. So far I have been talking about the elites as if they are all the same. But they aren't: the differences within the wealthiest one per cent are almost as stark as the difference between the top one per cent and the remaining 99. The millionaires want to reach the level of decamillionaires, who strive to match the centimillionaires, who are trying to keep up with billionaires. The result is very intense status rivalry, expressed through conspicuous consumption. Towards the end of the Republic, Roman aristocrats competed by exhibiting works of art and massive silver decorations in their homes. They threw extravagant banquets with peacocks from Samos, oysters from Lake Lucrino and snails from Africa, all imported at great expense. Archaeology confirms a genuine and dramatic shift towards luxury.

The US political system is much more attuned to the wishes of the rich than to the aspirations of the poor

Intra-elite competition also seems to affect the social mood. Norms of competition and extreme individualism become prevalent and norms of co-operation and collective action recede. Social Darwinism took off during the original Gilded Age, and Ayn Rand (who argued that altruism is evil) has grown astonishingly popular during what we might call our Second Gilded Age. The glorification of competition and individual success in itself becomes a driver of economic inequality. As Christopher Hayes wrote in Twilight of the Elites (2012): 'defenders of the status quo invoke a kind of neo-Calvinist logic by saying that those at the top, by virtue of their placement there, must be the most deserving'. By the same reasoning, those at the bottom are not deserving. As such social norms spread, it becomes increasingly easy for CEOs to justify giving themselves huge bonuses while cutting the wages of workers.

Such cultural attitudes work with economic forces to widen inequality. Economists know very well that few markets are 'efficient' in the sense that their prices are set entirely by the forces of supply and demand. Labour markets are especially sensitive to cultural norms about what is fair compensation, so prevailing theories about inequality have practical consequences. And labour markets are also strongly affected by government regulation, as the economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has argued. So let's consider how politics enters the equation here.

The US, as we saw, breeds strong links between wealth and politics. Some wealthy individuals run for office themselves. Others use their money to support their favoured politicians and policies. As a result, the US political system is much more attuned to the wishes of the rich than to the aspirations of the poor. Kevin Phillips has been one of the most influential voices raised in alarm at the dangers for democracy of growing wealth disparity.

Inverse relationship between well-being and inequality in American history. The peaks and valleys of inequality (in purple) represent the ratio of the largest fortunes to the median wealth of households (the Phillips curve). The blue-shaded curve combines four measures of well-being: economic (the fraction of economic growth that is paid to workers as wages), health (life expectancy and the average height of native-born population), and social optimism (the average age of first marriage, with early marriages indicating social optimism and delayed marriages indicating social pessimism).

Yet the US political system has been under the influence of wealthy elites ever since the American Revolution. In some historical periods it worked primarily for the benefit of the wealthy. In others, it pursued policies that benefited the society as a whole. Take the minimum wage, which grew during the Great Compression era and declined (in real terms) after 1980. The proportion of American workers who were unionised changed in a similarly cyclical fashion, as the legislative field tilted first one way then the other. The top marginal tax rate was 68 per cent or higher before 1980; by 1988 it declined to 28 per cent. In one era, government policy systematically favoured the majority, while in another it favoured the narrow interests of the wealthy elites. This inconsistency calls for explanation.

It is relatively easy to understand the periods when the wealthy bent the agenda to suit their interests (though of course, not all rich people care exclusively about their own wealth). How, though, can we account for the much more broadly inclusive policies of the Great Compression era? And what caused the reversal that ended the Gilded Age and ushered in the Great Compression? Or the second switch, which took place around 1980?

History provides another clue. Unequal societies generally turn a corner once they have passed through a long spell of political instability. Governing elites tire of incessant violence and disorder. They realise that they need to suppress their internal rivalries, and switch to a more co-operative way of governing, if they are to have any hope of preserving the social order. We see this shift in the social mood repeatedly throughout history — towards the end of the Roman civil wars (first century BC), following the English Wars of the Roses (1455-85), and after the Fronde (1648-53), the final great outbreak of violence that had been convulsing France since the Wars of Religion began in the late 16th century. Put simply, it is fear of revolution that restores equality. And my analysis of US history in a forthcoming book suggests that this is precisely what happened in the US around 1920.

Reforms that ensured an equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth turned out to be a highly effective counter to the lure of Bolshevism

These were the years of extreme insecurity. There were race riots (the 'Red Summer of 1919'), worker insurrections, and an Italian anarchist terrorist campaign aimed directly at the elites. The worst incident in US labour history was the West Virginia Mine War of 1920—21, culminating in the Battle of Blair Mountain. Although it started as a workers' dispute, the Mine War eventually turned into the largest armed insurrection that the US has ever seen, the Civil War excepted. Between 10,000 and 15,000 miners armed with rifles battled against thousands of strikebreakers and sheriff deputies. The federal government eventually called in the Air Force, the only time it has ever done so against its own people. Add to all this the rise of the Soviet Union and the wave of socialist revolutions that swept Europe after the First World War, triggering the Red Scare of 1921, and you get a sense of the atmosphere. Quantitative data indicate that this period was the most violent in US history, second only to the Civil War. It was much, much worse than the 1960s.

The US, in short, was in a revolutionary situation, and many among the political and business elites realised it. They began to push through a remarkable series of reforms. In 1921 and 1924, Congress passed legislation that effectively shut down immigration into the US. Although much of the motivation behind these laws was to exclude 'dangerous aliens' such as Italian anarchists and Eastern European socialists, the broader effect was to reduce the labour surplus. Worker wages grew rapidly. At around the same time, federal income tax came in and the rate at which top incomes were taxed began to increase. Somewhat later, provoked by the Great Depression, other laws legalised collective bargaining through unions, introduced a minimum wage, and established Social Security.

The US elites entered into an unwritten compact with the working classes. This implicit contract included the promise that the fruits of economic growth would be distributed more equitably among both workers and owners. In return, the fundamentals of the political-economic system would not be challenged (no revolution). The deal allowed the lower and upper classes to co-operate in solving the challenges facing the American Republic — overcoming the Great Depression, winning the Second World War, and countering the Soviet threat during the Cold War.

It almost goes without saying that there was a racist and xenophobic underside to all this. The co-operating group was mainly native-born white Protestants. African-Americans, Jews, Catholics and foreigners were excluded or heavily discriminated against. Nevertheless, while making such 'categorical inequalities' worse, the compact led to a dramatic reduction in overall economic inequality.

The 'New Deal Coalition' which ruled the US from 1932 to the late 1960s did so well that the business community, opposed to its policies at first, came to accept them in the post-war years. As the historian Kim Phillips-Fein wrote in Invisible Hands (2010):
Many managers and stockholders [made] peace with the liberal order that had emerged. They began to bargain regularly with the labour unions at their companies. They advocated the use of fiscal policy and government action to help the nation to cope with economic downturns. They accepted the idea that the state might have some role to play in guiding economic life.

When Barry Goldwater campaigned on a pro-business, anti-union and anti-big government platform in the 1964 presidential elections, he couldn't win any lasting support from the corporate community. The conservatives had to wait another 16 years for their triumph.

But by the late 1970s, a new generation of political and business leaders had come to power. To them the revolutionary situation of 1919-21 was just history. In this they were similar to the French aristocrats on the eve of the French Revolution, who did not see that their actions could bring down the Ancien Régime — the last great social breakdown, the Fronde, being so far in the past.

The US elites, similarly, took the smooth functioning of the political-economic system for granted. The only problem, as they saw it, was that they weren't being adequately compensated for their efforts. Feelings of dissatisfaction ran high during the Bear Market of 1973—82, when capital returns took a particular beating. The high inflation of that decade ate into inherited wealth. A fortune of $2 billion in 1982 was a third smaller, when expressed in inflation-adjusted dollars, than $1 billion in 1962, and only a sixth of $1 billion in 1912. All these factors contributed to the reversal of the late 1970s.

It is no coincidence that the life of Communism (from the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989) coincides almost perfectly with the Great Compression era. The Red Scares of, firstly, 1919—21 and then 1947—57 suggest that US elites took the Soviet threat quite seriously. More generally, the Soviet Union, especially in its early years, aggressively promoted an ideology that was highly threatening to the political-economic system favoured by the US elites. Reforms that ensured an equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth turned out to be a highly effective counter to the lure of Bolshevism.

Nevertheless, when Communism collapsed, its significance was seriously misread. It's true that the Soviet economy could not compete with a system based on free markets plus policies and norms that promoted equity. Yet the fall of the Soviet Union was interpreted as a vindication of free markets, period. The triumphalist, heady atmosphere of the 1990s was highly conducive to the spread of Ayn Randism and other individualist ideologies. The unwritten social contract that had emerged during the New Deal and braved the challenges of the Second World War had faded from memory.

What, then, explains the rapid growth of top fortunes in the US over the past 30 years? Why did the wages of unskilled workers stagnate or decline? What accounts for the bitterness of election rhetoric in the US, the growing legislative gridlock, the rampant political polarisation? My answer is that all of these trends are part of a complex and interlocking system. I don't just mean that everything affects everything else; that would be vacuous. Rather, that cliodynamic theory can tell us specifically how demographic, economic and cultural variables relate to one another, and how their interactions generate social change. Cliodynamics also explains why historical reversals in such diverse areas as economics and culture happen at roughly similar times. The theory of secular cycles was developed using data from historical societies, but it looks like it can provide answers to questions about our own society.

Our society, like all previous complex societies, is on a rollercoaster. Impersonal social forces bring us to the top; then comes the inevitable plunge. But the descent is not inevitable. Ours is the first society that can perceive how those forces operate, even if dimly. This means that we can avoid the worst — perhaps by switching to a less harrowing track, perhaps by redesigning the rollercoaster altogether.

Three years ago I published a short article in the science journal Nature. I pointed out that several leading indicators of political instability look set to peak around 2020. In other words, we are rapidly approaching a historical cusp, at which the US will be particularly vulnerable to violent upheaval. This prediction is not a 'prophecy'. I don't believe that disaster is pre-ordained, no matter what we do. On the contrary, if we understand the causes, we have a chance to prevent it from happening. But the first thing we will have to do is reverse the trend of ever-growing inequality.

Correction, Feb 13, 2013: When first published, this article misidentified Michael Bloomberg, the mayor of New York City, as an inheritor of a large fortune. In fact he amassed most of his wealth himself.

Published on 7 February 2013

The 5 Secrets to Public Speaking

… Or Any Kind of Public Performance

There are five secrets to giving a successful talk or presentation:

(1) Energy

(2) Harness your nerves

(3) Fake It 'Till You Make It

(4) Future Pacing

and

(5) Preparation

An Ounce of Energy is Worth a Pound of Technique

Energy is a vital component to good presentation.

If you're dragging and listless, you won't do well, no matter how prepared you are or how insightful your views.

Roger Ailes – Ronald Reagan's chief of communications and now the head of Fox News – might be an extremist, but he wrote a whole book on this subject which is really pretty good. The whole book can be summed up in the statement:

An ounce of energy is worth a pound of technique.

Look at Obama: Even if you hate all of his policies, you have to admit that he's got a lot of energy.

Ailes gives the following advice:

How do you get that kind of positive energy, especially when you're nervous about giving a speech, chairing a meeting, or being interviewed for a job or by the news media, for example.

Ask yourself: What am I thinking about? Am I focused on positive things like "This is an opportunity ….Let me review my agenda: What are the points I want to make? This can be fun; I've been asked to speak because the believe I'm an authority and can contribute something"? These kinds of thoughts will energize you in a way that will help you be successful.

If you like exercise, then you already know that vigorous exercise will boost your energy and pump you up. Go exercise before your talk.

If you aren't the exercise type (or even if you are), you may want to know that deep breathing and deep relaxation can effectively charge up your energy levels.

Moreover – as we'll discuss in the second secret – everyone has a free, abundant and always-available source of energy available for our public appearances.

Harness Your Nerves

The top professional musicians, speakers, tv and radio personalities, and other well-known performers all say that they still get nervous before performances. Interviews of everyone from mega rock stars to top trial lawyers prove that.

The trick is that top performers don't try to "fight" the nerves to stay calm. Instead, they look at the nervousness as the "fuel" that super-charges them to give a great performance.

The adrenaline pump of nervousness primes us to wake up, focus and treat our performance as important. This can give us strength, endurance, quick thinking and passion.

Through repeated experience, top performers know first-hand that this nervousness is the raw "fuel" which can power great performances.

Indeed, the top speakers, musicians, athletes and performers in every field know that nervousness is agood thing, because nervous energy is the raw fuel which powers their performance.

The top performers know how to channel that raw energy into a good performance. Successful performers look at nervous energy as rocket fuel to power an outstanding performance.

The trick is not to fight it. If you try to force your self not to be nervous, you will get more nervous and will not perform well.

Instead of labeling that feeling as being "stressed", "nervous", "panicky" or "freaked out", think of it as being "excited", "energized", "passionate", "primed" or "pumped".

Nothing I can write will convince you that stress is the fuel for a successful performance. I have performed enough – in front of thousands of people, and in high-stakes make-or-break situations – to know what I'm talking about, and performance experts say the same thing. But you have to verify this for yourself.

Practice speaking in front of groups of friends. Practice making a presentation to a co-worker. Practice getting nervous and performing well anyway. (And if your presentation is clumsy, go back and prepare more. See the 5th secret. Also ask your friends or co-workers what would make it better. Keep practicing – the more you practice the better you'll get.)

Doing that will prove to you that nervousness is simply part of the package, and that you can perform even when you're nervous. Again, remember that you're in good company: everyone gets nervous, including the world's top performers.

Fake It 'Till You Make It

The third secret is to do your best to imitate great speakers or performers who you admire.

Specifically, what the top experts say (and I've found to be true myself) is that "fake it 'till you make it" is the fastest way to improve your public appearances.

Here's an analogy. If you're pretty good at basketball, then think back to when you first started playing. You doubtless imitated Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant or another great player. If you've been playing a while, more of your moves will be spontaneous now. But you imitated well-known players when you started out, which propelled your skills forward.

Or if you're a pretty good artist, think back to when you first started painting. You likely imitated well-known artists; and painting "in their style" helped you develop your painting skills. Now – as a reasonably good artist – you can improvise a little more, and create some of your own style. But when you started out, you were just trying to parrot the greats.

In the same way, imitating master public speakers who you like will hone speaking and interviewing skills, and boost your speaking abilities by leaps and bounds.

"Faking it 'till you make it" is not false or insincere. It is the exact same learning process you employed when you started playing b-ball, or painting, or learning any other skill.

As you get more comfortable in public speaking, you can find your own style, or combine the best aspects of different public speakers you like. But for now, just imitate your favorite personality to get up and running, and to develop your skills.

Future Pacing

A related trick is to look at each performance – not as the BIG, all-or-nothing, make-or-break performance – but as practice for future performances.

Even if you're (1) going to be interviewed on tv and millions of viewers will see you, (2) going to sing on stage in front of thousands, or (3) you're going to give a business pitch in front of a conference room full of big cheeses … you're probably going to do something similar again in the future.

This may seem like your one-time shot … but odds are it isn't. If you're doing it now, you're probably going to do it again another time.

Instead of focusing on how you're doing NOW, shift your focus to thinking about it as practice for thenext interview. Specifically, the excellent things you do this time … you'll probably want to do the same thing next time also. The things you don't like about your public performance this time … you probably won't use next time.

Our minds are wired so that we learn fastest when we "practice" or "play". This helps take us out of a narrowed self-critical mindset to a more creative, expansive and relaxed perspective … And we performbetter with that perspective.

In addition, our minds are programmed to begin with an image in mind, and then to try our best to approximate that image (like in the third secret). So by thinking about what you want your futureperformance to be like, it makes your current performance better.

(This technique also works magic with dating. Instead of getting flustered when you're talking with THAT girl or THAT guy, think of your conversation as practice for when you meet attractive people in the future. It will go smoother, and you'll learn how to be a better and more eligible dater).

Prepare

"It usually takes more than three weeks to prepare a good impromptu speech."
- Mark Twain

"The very best impromptu speeches are the ones written well in advance."
- Actress Ruth Gordon

Nothing can replace preparation.

Unless you are one of the lucky people who can improvise well, you should outline your presentation, and then write out notes or use index cards to map out exactly what you want to say. Then practice until you don't need the notes anymore.

If you feel like you need some notes with you during the presentation, just jot down key words to jog your memory. If you try to read anything other than a couple of key words, you won't be able to pull it off.