candidates have taken quite different positions concerning the war in
Iraq. This is the wrong place to look. I believe it is fairly certain
that Barack Obama will be the next president of the United States. And
his views of the war in Iraq are almost the polar opposite of those of
his rival, John McCain. Obama was opposed to the U.S. invasion from
the outset. He believes continuing the war is harmful to everyone - to
the United States, to Iraq, to the rest of the world. And he says he
will seek to withdraw all U.S. troops in sixteen months.
Once in office, Obama will no doubt find that the definition of
withdrawing troops will be a matter of great controversy in the United
States, and that it will be less easy than he claims to achieve his
objective, were it a matter only of the internal politics of the
United States. However, ending the war in Iraq will not be up to
Obama, or up to the United States. The key to ending the war in Iraq
is what happens in Iraqi politics, not in U.S. politics.
I shall make the rash prediction that sometime in 2009 (or 2010 at the
very latest), the Prime Minister of Iraq will be Muqtada al-Sadr, and
that al-Sadr will bring the war to an end. Here is what is most likely
to happen. The world media remind us each day of what are now seen as
definitive cleavages in the Iraqi body politic. There are three main
ethnic groups - the Shi'a, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds. Each of
them is primarily located in a specific geographic zone. The main
exception is the capital city of Baghdad, which has mixed Sunni-Shi'a
population, although even here they are geographically concentrated in
specific parts of the city.
In addition, as we all seem to know by now, each of these zones has
internal divisions. There are multiple Shi'a parties, who each seem to
have a militia at its disposal, and have long-standing antagonisms.
The two principal ones are the group led by al-Sadr and the one known
as SCIRI, led by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim. The Sunni areas have a less
clearcut picture. There are the sheikhs and the ex-Baathists,
connected with various politicians in the Iraqi legislature. And there
is also a small but important group of jihadists, largely non-Iraqi,
linked somehow to al-Qaeda. And in the Kurdish zone, there are two
competing parties, plus Christian and Turkmen minorities.
Actually, this kind of complicated array is no more diverse than one
finds in many countries all around the world. Think of how one would
describe the array of groups involved in U.S. politics. So, if we are
to understand what is likely to happen in Iraq, we have to cut through
this diversity to get at the most salient issue or issues.
It seems to me that the most salient issue in Iraq today for Iraqis is
whether or not Iraq will survive as a unified state and as one that
will be able to recover its strong position, economically and
geopolitically, in the region. Who is against this? Actually, there
are only two groups who are seriously hostile to a renewed and
revivified Iraqi nationalism - the Kurds and the Shi'a forces led by
al-Hakim. The latter dream of an autonomous, indeed independent,
southern Iraq, which they would dominate and within which there are
rich oil resources. They want to cut all ties to the Sunni regions.
And they want to weaken seriously the al-Sadr camp which, although it
is strong in that region, is virtually uncontested in Baghdad. Were
Baghdad cut off from that region, the al-Hakim camp believe they could
eventually destroy the al-Sadr camp.
The Kurds of course dream of an independent Kurdish state. But they
are eminently pragmatic people. They know that a landlocked Kurdish
state would find it hard to survive. Turkey would probably invade, and
so might Iran. The United States would probably do very little, and
would be quite embarrassed by it all. And Israel would be irrelevant.
So the Kurds are clearly ready to settle for continuing de facto
autonomy within a unified Iraq. To be sure, they are still quarreling
with the others over who would control Kirkuk. I doubt that they will
get Kirkuk, and I suspect that the most that they will do about it is
to grumble loudly.
Now let us look at the others. The Sunni Arab forces are also, by and
large, quite realistic. They realize that it is impossible to return
to an Iraq that they govern unilaterally. What they really want now is
their fair share of the state political machinery and of its resources
(since their zone has virtually no oil, at least up to now). While
they cannot hope to have a Sunni-dominated Iraq, they can hope to have
an Iraq restored to its former prominent role in the Arab world, and
they would clearly benefit, individually and collectively, from such a
restoration.
So, in the end, the key group is the Shi'a. Muqtada al-Sadr has been
quite clear from the beginning that he wants a unified Iraq. For one
thing, this is the only way his people in Baghdad can survive and
flourish. For another, he believes in Iraq. To be sure, he and his
followers suffered mightily under the Baathists. But he is open to
dealing with reformed and much weakened Baathists. And he has
demonstrated this clearly over the last two years. He gave moral
support to the people of Falluja when they were under assault by the
U.S. forces two years ago. And they reciprocated in the recent
fighting in Baghdad, when his forces were under assault by the same
U.S. forces.
That leaves one major player, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the
most important spiritual leader of the Shi'a in Iraq. Al-Sistani has
played a careful political game ever since the U.S. invasion. His
priority has been to hold the Shi'a together. Most of the time he says
nothing. But at crucial moments he is ready to intervene. When the
U.S. proconsul of yesteryear, L. Paul Bremer, wanted to create an
Iraqi government more or less by his fiat, al-Sistani insisted on
elections, and the United States had to back down. As a result, he got
a government dominated by the Shi'a. When too much fighting occurred
between the al-Hakim camp and the al-Sadr camp, he brokered a calm.
What does al-Sistani want? Theologically, he wants Najaf, his site, to
become once again the theological center of the Shi'a religious world,
as opposed to Qom in Iran, which has come to assume this role,
especially since the Iranian revolution of 1979. Geopolitically, this
requires a strong Iraq, capable of relating to Iran as an equal. And
to get a strong Iraq, he needs a united Iraq, and essentially one that
gets the U.S. invaders out.
Currently, the United States is trying to get Iraq to sign a long-term
military accord that would guarantee U.S. bases indefinitely. The
current prime minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is trying to maneuver
this without a vote even by parliament. Muqtada al-Sadr is calling for
a referendum. And so, it seems, is al-Sistani. A referendum, of
course, guarantees a defeat for the accord.
So, in 2009, it would seem logical that al-Sadr, al-Sistani, the
Sunni, and even the Kurds will come together on a plank of national
unity and U.S. total withdrawal without long-term bases. Muqtada
al-Sadr will implement this as Prime Minister. Al-Hakim will be
unhappy, but kept in line by al-Sistani. The Iranians will be
ambivalent. The U.S. public and pundits will be amazed at the relative
calm in Iraq. And President Obama and the Pentagon won't have too much
choice. They will graciously assent. They may even proclaim "victory."
by Immanuel Wallerstein
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Original article:http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
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